Abstract. We present SAM, a symbolic model checker for ACTL, the action-based version of CTL. SAM relies on implicit representations of Labeled Transition Systems (LTSs), the semantic domain for ACTL formulae, and makes use of symbolic manipulation algorithms. SAM has been realized by translating (networks of) LTSs and, possibly recursive, ACTL formulae into BSP (Boolean Symbolic Programming), a programming language aiming at de ning computations on boolean functions, and by using the BSP interpreter to carry out computations (i.e. verications).
Introduction
The increasing reliance of many aspects of human society on highly complex computer systems requires the adoption of innovative validation techniques. In the validation of software di culties arise from the discontinuous nature of the software behaviour. This behaviour is based on sequences of discrete transitions, with such a high number of possible evolution paths and failure modes, that exhaustive testing becomes impossible. Moreover, testing can provide information only on the tested paths. Hence, due to the lack of continuity, we cannot infer the behaviour of untested sequences from that of the tested ones.
Formal methods are mathematically based techniques that can o er a rigorous and e ective way to model, design and analyze computer systems. It is increasingly accepted that the adoption of formal methods in the life cycle development of embedded systems would guarantee higher levels of dependability. It appears that, due to the lower costs of training and innovation, industries are more keen to accept formal validation techniques assessing the quality attributes of their products, obtained by a traditional life cycle, rather than a fully formal life cycle development. However, to achieve an e cient use of formal methods in industry, such methods need to be better integrated with traditional software engineering. Formal \validation" and \veri cation" techniques and automated support tools need to be improved so that they could be easily used by nonexpert sta .
gramming language aiming at de ning computations on boolean functions, and by using the BSP interpreter to carry out computations (i.e. veri cations).
The integration of SAM in JACK 4] , an environment for the speci cation and formal veri cation of concurrent systems that also includes a model checker for ACTL using explicit state space representation, is in progress. A number of formal validation projects using SAM are under progress too. 4] , that so far is the only veri cation environment including an ACTL model checker (AMC, 18] ). JACK is an environment based on the use of process algebrae, automata and temporal logic formalisms, which supports many phases of the system development process. The idea behind the JACK environment is to integrate di erent speci cation and veri cation tools, independently developed at di erent research institutes (I.E.I.-C.N.R. and the University of Rome \La Sapienza" in Italy, and INRIA in France), to provide an environment in which a user can choose from several veri cation tools by means of a user-friendly graphic interface.
The FC2 format 21], i.e. the common representation format for data, makes it possible to exchange information among the tools integrated in JACK and to easily add other tools to the JACK environment, thus extending its potential. The FC2 format allows a Labeled Transition System (i.e. an automaton) to be represented by means of a set of tables that keep the information about state names, arc labels, and transition relations between states. The format allows nets of automata to be represented as well.
Some of the tools in JACK allow a process speci cation to be built. This can be done both by entering a speci cation in a textual form (i.e. a process algebraic term) by using MAUTO, or by drawing the automaton that describes the behavior of the process by using ATG 25] . Moreover, sophisticated graphical procedures, provided by ATG, allow a speci cation to be built as a network of processes (or networks). Hence, a hierarchical approach in the speci cation activity is also possible.
Once the speci cation of a system has been written, JACK permits the construction of the automaton corresponding to the behaviour of the overall system, by using either MAUTO or FC2LINK and HOGGAR (which is a BDD-based tool); this is the model of the system. Moreover, by using MAUTO or HOGGAR, automata can be minimized with respect to various (bisimulation) equivalences. ACTL can be used to describe temporal properties and model checking can be performed, by using AMC, to check whether systems (i.e. their models) satisfy the properties.
JACK has been successfully used in several case studies. In 12] JACK was used to formally specify the hardware components of a bu er system, and to verify the correctness of the speci cation with respect to some safety requirements. In 3] the veri cation of an interlocking safety critical system developed by Ansaldo Trasporti was presented.
Model checking by using JACK has a major limiting factor, namely the state space explosion problem. Indeed, AMC can perform model checking only onto a single automaton (i.e. AMC cannot take a network of automata as a model); thus it is always necessary to generate the global automaton of the system. SAM, the extension of JACK presented in this paper, is aimed at solving the state space explosion problem.
CCS/Meije
Process algebrae 22] are generally recognized as a convenient tool for describing reactive systems at di erent levels of abstraction. They rely on a small set of basic operators, used to build complex descriptions from more elementary ones, and on behavioral equivalences (e.g. bisimulation) or preorders (e.g. testing), used to study the relationships between descriptions of the same system at di erent levels of abstraction (e.g., speci cation and implementation).
In the JACK environment, the process algebra used to de ne processes is CCS/Meije 1]. The syntax of the language is based on a set of elementary and uninterpreted actions that processes can perform and on a set of operators that permit to build complex processes from simpler ones. The syntax permits a twolayered design of process terms. The rst level is related to sequential regular terms, the second one to networks of parallel sub-processes supporting communication and action renaming or restriction. The CCS/Meije syntax relies on the following assumptions. { Act, ranged over by , is the set of names. Such names represent emitted signals if they are terminated by "!" or received ones if they are terminated by "?"; { denotes a special action not belonging to Act. Action represents the unobservable action (to model internal process communications); { Act = Act f g, ranged over by a, denotes the full set of actions that a process can perform; { X, ranged over by X, is the set of term variables.
The following grammar generates all regular terms, ranged over by R, and all network terms, ranged over by P: R ::= stop j X j a : R j R + R j let rec X = R and X = R] in X P ::= R j P//P j Pna j P a/b] j let X = P and X = P] in X where ...] denotes an optional and repeatable part of the syntax.
The usual semantic models of process algebrae are Labeled Transition Systems (LTSs, 23]), which describe the behavior of a process in terms of states and labeled transitions between states.
De nition1. An LTS is a 4-tuple A = (S; s 0 ; Act ; !), where: S is a nite set of states; s 0 is the initial state; Act is a nite set of observable actions and is the unobservable action; ! S Act S is the transition relation. Table 1 . Operational semantics of some CCS/Meije operators.
The two-layered structure of CCS/Meije descriptions is re ected also by the graphical methodology that can be used in connection with ATG and that will be illustrated in Section 3.2.
-ACTL
In this section we brie y present -ACTL 13, 16], the temporal logic used in the JACK environment. We refer the interested reader to 11] for a more detailed description.
-ACTL is suitable to express properties of reactive systems whose behaviour is characterized by the actions they perform and whose semantics is de ned by means of LTS's. The logic can be used to de ne both liveness (something good eventually happen) and safety (nothing bad can happen) properties of reactive systems. Moreover, -ACTL is adequate with respect to strong bisimulation equivalence, namely if p q, then p and q satisfy the same set of -ACTL formulae.
The de nition of -ACTL relies on an auxiliary logic of action. The collection AF (ranged over by ) of action formulae over a set of (visible) actions Act (ranged over by ) is de ned by the following grammar:
::= j: j ^ . We write ff for 0^: 0 , where a 0 is some chosen action, tt for :ff and _ 0 for :(: ^: 0 ). The satisfaction relation of an action formula by an action , j = , is de ned inductively by: j = i = ; j = : i not j = ; j = ^ 0 i j = and j = 0 .
Intuitively, action formulae express sets of (observable) actions. Given an action formula , the set of the actions satisfying is ( ) = f j j = g.
The syntax of -ACTL formulae is de ned by the following grammar:
where Y ranges over a set Var of variables, state formulae are ranged over by , path formulae are ranged over by , E and A are path quanti ers, X and U are the next and until operators.
The following standard constructions over a LTS A = (S; s 0 ; Act ; !) will be used to de ne the formal semantics of -ACTL. { A path is called maximal if either it is in nite or it is nite and its last state r has no successor states (i.e. D(r) = ;). The set of maximal paths from r will be denoted by (r).
{ If = , we say that is a pre x of ; if = (r 0 ; a 1 ; r 1 )(r 1 ; a 2 ; r 2 ) : : :, r 0 is the empty pre x of ; each path is a pre x of itself.
{ The length of a path , j j, is ! if is an in nite sequence, 0 if is an empty path, and n + 1 if = (r 0 ; a 1 ; r 1 )(r 1 ; a 2 ; r 2 ) : : :(r n ; a n+1 ; r n+1 ), with n > 0.
Let A = (S; s 0 ; Act ; !) be a LTS. The satisfaction relation between a state formula (resp. a path formula ) and a state s (resp. a path ) of A, written as s j = A (resp. j = A ), When the transition system A is clear from the context, we shall write s j = instead of s j = A . We say that a LTS A = (S; s 0 ; Act ; !) veri es , written A j = , when s 0 j = A .
Several useful derived modalities can be de ned, starting from the basic ones. In particular, we will write: 
Boolean Symbolic Programming (BSP)
BSP is a programming language aimed at de ning, possibly xpoint, computations on boolean functions 27]. BSP primitives include boolean operations, quanti ers, arithmetic operations (ALU-like). De ning processes just using boolean operations is a tedious and error prone task. Thus BSP has primitives to de ne processes as well. The output of a BSP program is formed by \answers" to BSP queries. Essentially BSP queries correspond to the usual queries on BDDs. E.g.: \Is a given boolean function identically 1 (true)?", \Print the set of satisfying assignments of a given boolean function". Shortly, BSP is a programming language to de ne symbolic computations at a logical level rather than at the BDD level.
The BSP compiler translates a BSP program into a sequence of calls to BDD primitives (essentially if then else and compose). This translation is done in time O(s) where s is the size of the BSP program being translated. During such translation some optimization is also carried out (e.g. when possible BDD calls are moved outside of loops computing xpoints, BDD calls are rearranged in an attempt to free BDDs as soon as possible). BSP tries to e ciently execute a given symbolic program. However, as for any programming language, it is the user responsibility to write e cient (symbolic) programs.
Implementations as well as speci cations can both be de ned using BSP. E.g.: a netlist of size n can be translated into a BSP program of size O(n); a -calculus formula of size n can be translated into a BSP program of size O(n) 27]. These features make BSP suitable as a low level language to de ne nite state veri cation tasks. Moreover having implementation and speci cation de ned using the same language enables the use of rewriting techniques to speed up veri cation 27]. Note that BSP is a programming language rather than a Model Checker. Thus BSP can be used for other purposes as well (e.g. see 28]).
The extended version of JACK
In this section we comment on the architecture of the extended version of JACK, which is depicted in Figure 1 , by especially pointing out the new features introduced with respect to JACK. Then, by means of a simple example, we will show how the new environment can be used as a support for the speci cation and veri cation of reactive systems. 
The architecture
The user can use three di erent formalisms for de ning the reactive systems used as models for checking logical properties. A part from textual (CCS/Meije) and graphical (ATG) representations, that both are translated rst into the FC2 format and then into BSP, a tabular representation can be used as well, that is directly translated into BSP. Tabular representations have the same overall structure of FC2 speci cations (i.e. the description of a system is composed of the descriptions of the system components and of the descriptions of their synchronizations), but have simplied syntax and semantics so that the structure of systems is described in a more straightforward way. The tabular representation aims at helping the user to better understand system descriptions as well as to make the user able to generate himself system descriptions directly without using graphical representations.
The user can express logical properties that must be checked as -calculus and -ACTL formulae.
Both the formalisms for specifying processes, basically FC2 and tabular representations, and the formalisms for specifying properties, namely -calculus and -ACTL, are translated, in linear time complexity, into BSP. Therefore, checking whether a reactive system s veri es a property p consists in querying the BSP interpreter if the boolean function \tr(s) implies tr(p)" is identically one, where tr(s) is the BSP program that represents s and tr(p) is the BSP program that represents p.
Symbolic model checking in practice System speci cation
Let us consider a level crossing that can be crossed at a given time either by a train or by at most two cars. A train asks for the permission to cross by using action approaching t and signals that it has crossed by using action leaving t. A car behaves similarly but uses actions approaching c and leaving c, respectively. These are the only visible actions of the system. Normally, the barriers are kept open, thus cars can cross. The railway signal allows a train to proceed only if the barriers can go down safely, namely when no car is crossing. After a train has crossed, the barriers will go up again.
The speci cation of the system is a net, called crossing, composed of two automata, barrier representing the controller of the barrier and signal representing the controller of the railway signal. Figure 2 shows their graphical ATG representations. While the two component automata (top of Figure 2 ) should be self-explicative, here we comment on the network that describes the overall system (bottom of Figure 2 ). Boxes (e.g. barrier and signal) can be processes or networks, thus allowing a top-down approach in the speci cation activity. Ports at the border of boxes are their interconnection places. If two boxes are drawn at the same level, they can synchronize via the actions that label linked ports. In addition to CCS/Meije, a multiway synchronization operator, called wedge, is available: more than two processes can synchronize by executing an action (e.g barrier and signal synchronize on approaching t which labels a wedge). As in the case of a textual speci cation, the behaviour of a graphical speci cation can be de ned in terms of an LTS.
Once the FC2 representation of crossing has been obtained by using ATG and FC2LINK, we can construct the corresponding tabular representation by using the utility totab.
This construction, shown in Figure 3 , is not needed and has been done only to give a avor of what the tabular representation is. In this representation, all the possible actions that an automaton or a net can do are explicitly enumerated. The tabular description of an automaton, other than the possible actions, speci es the possible transitions that the automaton can do. In de ning the transitions, action indexes are used in place of action names. More speci cally, transitions are speci ed as triples of numbers of the form: n0: n1 -> n2. Such a Fig. 2 triple indicates that the automaton can evolve from state n1 to state n2 by performing action n0. The tabular description of a net with n components speci es the structure of the global system by means of the n-uple of numbers following the keyword Components. This n-uple indicates the templates of automata that constitute the system. In the case of crossing, the tuple 2 3 says that the system is composed by one instance of the automaton 2, i.e. barrier and one instance of the automaton 3, i.e. signal. The synchronizations among the components are speci ed as n+1-uple of numbers. Hence, in our case we have triples of numbers. A triple of the form n0: n1 n2 indicates that if the rst component can perform action n1 and the second component can perform action n2 then the system can perform action n0. A 0 value for ni means that the corresponding component does not take part into the synchronization. The major simpli cation with respect to FC2 speci cations is that both the transition de nitions and the synchronization de nitions use \plain" action indexes rather than generic expressions with action indexes as operands. Both the FC2 and the tabular representations can be given as an input to the utility tobsp that returns a BSP program that represents the system.
BSP program of the speci cation
The BSP program that represents the barrier is given in Figure 4 . Hereafter, we explain the main features of the language BSP. Examples refer to Figures 4, 5 and 7. Comments are C-like, i.e. started with /* and ended with */. A declaration of the form (def id (array n)) de nes the identi er id to be a vector of n boolean variables. We will refer to an identi er declared in this way as an array. Thus arrays denote vectors of boolean variables. For example, (def C1 a (array 2)), (def C1 px (array 1)) declare arrays ranging, respectively, on actions and present states of C1 . Boolean variables are represented with BDD variables. Unless otherwise instructed BSP uses as BDD variable ordering the ordering in which boolean variables (arrays) are declared. It is possible to override this behaviour by instructing BSP to follow a user given BDD variable ordering.
A declaration of the form (def id (record X 1 : : :X n )) de nes identi er id as the vector of boolean variables obtained by concatenating the vectors of boolean variables X 1 : : :X n . We will refer to an identi er declared in this way as a record. Note that no new BDD variable is created by such declaration. For example, (def px (record C1 px C2 px)) gives name px to the vector of boolean variables formed by the variables in C1 px or in C2 px.
A declaration of the form (enum size offset (id 0 : : :id k?1 )) de nes identi ers id 0 : : :id k?1 to be vectors of size boolean values. Identi er id 0 is the boolean representation of offset mod 2 size , id 1 is the boolean representation of (offset + 1) mod 2 size , etc. For example, (enum 2 0 (C1 a0 C1 a1 C1 a2 C1 a3)) assigns to C1 a0, C1 a1, C1 a2, C1 a3 respectively the vectors 0 0], 1 0], 0 1], 1 1] (note: the leftmost bit is the least signi cant bit).
(def C1_a (array 2)) (enum 2 0 (C1_a0 C1_a1 C1_a2 C1_a3)) (def C1_px (array 1)) (def C1_nx (array 1)) (enum 1 0 (C1_s1 C1_s2)) (def C1_S ( eqv C1_px C1_s1)) ( 
Fig. 4. BSP program of barrier
A term of size n is a vector of n boolean expressions. For example, C1 a, C1 s1, px, are terms of size, respectively, 2, 1, 3. More complex terms can be built using boolean operators and quanti ers. For example, if a is a record or an array and R and F 0F 1 are terms of size n then the following are terms of size n: (and R F 0F 1) (semantics: bitwise and of R and F 0F 1), (exists a (and R F 0F 1)) (semantics: (9 a (R^F 0F 1)) ). If t 1 , t 2 are terms of size n then (eqv t 1 t 2 ) is a term of size 1 evaluating to 1 i terms t 1 , t 2 are bitwise equal.
A de nition (def id t) assigns to id the value of term t. For example, C1 S denotes a boolean function which is 1 (true) i C1 px is bitwise equal to C1 s1.
A term of the form (defprocess : : :) is used to de ne the transition relation of a process (LTS). For example, C1 R is a boolean function which is 1 i in the LTS C1 there is a transition labeled with C1 a from state C1 px to state C1 nx.
The transition relation for the parallel composition of two LTSs is obtained by de ning in BSP the semantics of the parallel composition operator. For each automaton constituting the system (i.e. barrier and signal), a boolean function modeling its set of transitions is constructed. Similarly, the global system (i.e. crossing) transitions are modeled as a boolean function constructed starting from the transitions of the system components. Part of the BSP program that represents the crossing is given in Figure 5 . /* definition of missing components */ (def a (array 3)) (enum 3 0 (a0 a1 a2 a3 a4)) (def px (record C1_px C2_px)) (def nx (record C1_nx C2_nx)) (def aa (record C1_a C2_a)) (def S (and C1_S C2_S)) (def R (or (exists aa (and (eqv a a1) C1_R (eqv C1_a C1_a1) C2_R (eqv C2_a C2_a1))) (exists aa (and (eqv a a2) C1_R (eqv C1_a C1_a2) C2_R (eqv C2_a C2_a2))) (exists aa (and (eqv a a3) (eqv C1_px C1_nx) C2_R (eqv C2_a C2_a3))) (exists aa (and (eqv a a4) C1_R (eqv C1_a C1_a3) (eqv C2_px C2_nx))) )) 
The properties
We have veri ed the following properties:
1. if a train leaves the level crossing (event leaving t) then, rst, it has to approach to the level crossing (event approaching t);
2. if a train approaches to the level crossing then it must immediately leave the level crossing; 3. if a car approaches the crossing (event approaching c) then no train can approach the crossing until a car leaves (event leaving c) the crossing; 4. it is possible to have any number of cars approaching and leaving the crossing. The -ACTL formulae that correspond to the previous properties are shown in Figure 6 . Figure 7 shows the (simpli ed) BSP translation of the rst formula in Figure 6 .
(def F_3FFB_1 (exists nx (exists a (and R (eqv a a4))))) (def F_2FF_1 (exists nx (and (exists a (and R (not (eqv a a1)))) (compose F_3FFB_1 px nx)))) (def F_1F_1 (or F_2FF_1 F_0E_1)) (def F_0E_1 (exists nx (and (exists a (and R b1)) (compose F_1F_1 px nx)))) (def F_3F_1 (not F_0E_1)) Fig. 7 . BSP translation of the rst formula in Figure 6 Results of model checking
Once that the BSP programs of the speci cation and of the logical formulae have been produced, for each formula that must be checked, i.e. for each boolean function F * i, a query of the form (def check_fun_i (forall px (imp S F_*_i))) (isone check_fun_i)
is added to the le containing the translations, and the BSP interpreter is called on the le. The BSP term (isone check fun i) asks BSP to check whether the boolean function check fun i is identically 1, in that case the formula is true.
The results of the model checking of the formulae in Figure 6 are in Figure 8 . Note that all the formulae are true.
isone check_fun_1 AutVarOrd "check_fun_1" = function check_fun_1 is identically 1 isone check_fun_2 AutVarOrd "check_fun_2" = function check_fun_2 is identically 1 isone check_fun_3 AutVarOrd "check_fun_3" = function check_fun_3 is identically 1 isone check_fun_4 AutVarOrd "check_fun_4" = function check_fun_4 is identically 1 Fig. 8 . Answers of the BSP interpreter
Conclusions
We have presented a symbolic model checker, SAM, for an action-based temporal logics that directly performs veri cation over Labeled Transition Systems. To our knowledge, this is the rst attempt in this direction, since previous symbolic model-checkers have been de ned for state-based temporal logics such as CTL. SAM is currently used in a number of formal validation projects, among which we recall, in particular, the validation of fault tolerance mechanisms de ned for an architecture for dependable systems, developed inside the european project GUARDS 2]. Three fault-tolerant mechanisms (namely, Inter-Consistency algorithm, Fault-Treatment mechanism and Multi-Level Integrity mechanism), have been modeled using the tools of the JACK environment; the possible occurrence of faults has been modeled by introducing explicit \fault" actions in the model, and di erent fault assumptions have been modeled, in order to study the behaviour of the mechanism under di erent fault hypotheses. The satisfaction of some critical properties of the mechanism, both in presence of faults or not, is the object of the on-going validation e ort. In a rst phase of the project, we were able to verify the properties of the Inter-node consistency algorithm when designed for a three node GUARDS architecture. The model exhibited (after some abstraction) around 70000 states and was a ordable by AMC, the traditional model checker for ACTL. When the algorithm for a four-node GUARDS architecture has been considered in the next phase of the project, it turned out that it was no more tractable by AMC, since the size was grown to 10 7 states. The fault treatment mechanism is the largest model we have generated inside this project, amounting to 2 10 9 states. Veri cation of critical properties is now in progress using SAM.
The integration of SAM within the JACK environment is under development, together with a friendly user interface.
